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Abstract This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in
contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which
each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with
drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with
the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher
stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier,
because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off
between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses
occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
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1. Introduction
To provide more excitement for the players, the (online) gambling indus-
try introduced casino tournaments. The rules are simple: all participants
pay a fixed amount of money prior to the tournament—the “buy-in”—that
enters into the prize pool. In return, they receive chips, which they can invest
in the casino gamble throughout the tournament. At the end of the tourna-
ment, the player who has most chips wins a prize, which is the sum of the
buy-ins minus some fee charged by the organizers. Benefits are two-sided:
players restrict their maximal loss to the buy-in and enjoy a new, strategic
component of the game; the casino makes a sure profit through the fee it
charges.
The observability of each other’s chip stacks throughout the tournament
depends on the provider. The no-observability case is a good illustration
of our model—in equilibrium, players use the gamble even though it has a
negative expected value.1
In the model, each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brow-
nian Motion (Xt) with (usually negative) constant drift coefficient µ, con-
stant diffusion coefficient σ, and initial endowment x0. If a player becomes
bankrupt, i.e., Xt = 0, she has to stop. The player who stops at the highest
value wins a prize.
Instead of an explicit cost for a higher contest success (e.g., Lazear and
Rosen, 1981, Hillman and Samet, 1987), here, higher prizes are riskier. In
equilibrium, players maximize their winning probability rather than the ex-
pected value of the process. Hence, they do not stop immediately even if
the underlying process is decreasing in expectation. Intuitively, if all other
players stop immediately, it is better for the remaining player to play until
she wins a small amount or goes bankrupt, since she can ensure she wins an
arbitrarily small positive amount with a probability arbitrarily close to one.
In the unique equilibrium outcome, expected losses are non-monotonic
1Several online casinos use a leaderboard for the chip stacks. In most cases, however, it
updates with a delay to create more tension. In this variant, players should only play close
to the end of the contest to veil their realizations. The resulting equilibrium distributions
are equivalent to the no-observability case.
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in the expected value of the gamble—a more favorable gamble can lead to
higher expected losses. Intuitively, this results from the trade-off between
risk and reward: if the gamble has only a slightly negative expected value,
the relatively high probability of winning makes people stop later, which
increases expected losses. If the principal—who might have imperfect infor-
mation about drift—obtains wins or losses of the players, contests are not
a reliable compensation scheme, because even with a slightly negative drift,
the principal incurs a large loss.
The formal analysis proceeds as follows. Proposition 1 derives a necessary
formula for an implied stopping chance F (x) in the symmetric equilibrium
of an n-player game that pinpoints the unique candidate equilibrium distri-
bution. To do so, we exploit that each player has to be indifferent between
stopping and continuing at any point of her support at any point in time.
For the two-player case, Proposition 2 derives the equilibrium stopping
time that induces F (x) explicitly. It involves mixing whether to stop with a
chance that depends on the current state Xt. Proposition 4 extends Propo-
sition 1 and 2 to a two-player game with asymmetric starting values.
For more than two players, Proposition 3 ensures the existence of a stop-
ping time that induces F (x). Its proof relies on a result in probability theory
on the Skorokhod embedding problem. This literature—initiated by Sko-
rokhod (1961, 1965)—analyzes the conditions under which a stopping time
of a stochastic process exists that embeds, i.e., induces, a given probability
distribution; for an excellent survey article, see Oblo´j (2004). In the proof
of Proposition 3, we verify a sufficient condition from Pedersen and Peskir
(2001). This whole approach is new to game theory, and the main technical
contribution of this paper.
Proposition 5 provides the main characterization result: the general shape
of the expected value of the stopped processes is quasi-convex, falling, then
rising in the drift µ and in the variance σ. In particular, highest expected
losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
Apart from casino tournaments, this paper provides a stylized model for
the following applications. First, consider a private equity fund that invests
in start-up companies. The value of the fund is mostly private information
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until maturity, because start-ups do not trade on the stock market and the
composition of the fund is often unknown. The model analyzes a competition
between fund managers in which, at maturity, the best performing manager
gets a prize—a bonus or a job promotion.
In this application, there are several possible reasons for a downward drift.
For instance, there may be no good investment opportunities in the market.
Moreover, the downward drift may capture the cost of paying an expert
to search for possible investments. The model predicts that the return on
investment is very sensitive to the profitability of investment opportunities.
In particular, a slightly negative drift is most harmful for the investors. In
this case, contestants behave as if they were risk-loving, which a payment
based on absolute success could avoid.
As a second example, consider a competition in a declining industry. In a
duopoly, for instance, firms compete to survive and get the monopoly profit.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) model the situation as a war of attrition—only
the firm who stays alone in the market wins a prize, but both incur costs
until one firm drops out.
In an interpretation of our model, managers of both firms decide if they
want to make risky investments—into R&D or stocks of other firms. Invest-
ments are costly, but could improve the firm’s value. When the duopoly
becomes unprofitable, the firm with the higher value wins—either by a take-
over battle or because the other firm cannot compete in a prize war—and its
manager keeps his job.
Our model predicts that managers choose very risky strategies. In par-
ticular, investors lose most money in expectation if investment opportunities
have a slightly negative expected value, which is consistent with being in
a declining industry. This effect increases in the asymmetry of the firms’
values. Intuitively, to satisfy the indifference condition for the stronger firm,
the weaker firm has to make up for its initial disadvantage by taking higher
risks.
1.1. Related Literature
Hvide (2002) investigates whether tournaments lead to excessive risk-
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taking behavior. He modifies Lazear and Rosen (1981) by assuming that
players bear costs to raise their expected value, but can raise their variance
without costs. In equilibrium, they choose maximum variance and low effort.
Similarly, Anderson and Cabral (2007) scrutinize an infinite competition in
which two players, who observe each other, can update their binary choice of
variance continuously. In their model, flow payoffs depend on the difference
in contest success. In equilibrium, both players choose the risky strategy
until the lead of one player is above a threshold; in this case, the leader
switches to the save option.
In the literature on races, players balance a higher effort cost against
a higher winning probability. Moscarini and Smith (2007)—building on
a discrete time model of Harris and Vickers (1987)—analyze a two-person
continuous-time race with costly effort choice. In equilibrium, effort is in-
creasing in the lead of a player up to some threshold above which the laggard
resigns; for an application to political economy, see also Gul and Pesendorfer
(2010). These papers assume full observability of each other’s contest success
over time. In our model, however, stopping decisions and realizations of the
rivals are unobservable.
Regarding the assumptions on information and payoffs, the model most
resembles a silent timing game—as first explored in Karlin (1953), and most
recently, in Park and Smith (2008). The latter paper also generalizes the all-
pay war of attrition, and so assumes that later stopping times cost linearly
more. Contrary to a silent timing game, in the present paper, players do
not only possess private information about their stopping decision, but also
about the realization of their stochastic process.
Finally, the paper relates to the finance literature on gambling for res-
urrection; e.g., Downs and Rocke (1994). In this literature, managers take
unfavorable gambles for a chance to save their firms from bankruptcy. Here,
however, players take high risks to veil their contest outcomes.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 de-
rives the unique equilibrium distribution. In Section 4, we state the main
characterization result, Proposition 5, and discuss its implications. Section
5 concludes.
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2. The Model
There are n agents i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} = N who face a stopping problem in
continuous time. At each point in time t ∈ R+, agent i privately observes
the realization of a stochastic process X i = (X it)t∈R+ with
X it = x0 + µt+ σB
i
t .
The constant x0 > 0 denotes the starting value of all processes; see Section 4.3
for heterogeneous starting values. The drift µ ∈ R is the common expected
change of each process X it per time, i.e., E(X it+∆ − X it) = µ∆. The noise
term is an n-dimensional Brownian motion (Bt) scaled by σ ∈ R+.
2.1. Strategies
A strategy of player i is a stopping time τ i. This stopping time depends
only on the realization of his process X it , as the player only observes his
own process.2 Mathematically, the agents’ stopping decision until time t
has to be F it -measurable, where F it = σ({X is : s < t}) is the sigma algebra
induced by the possible observations of the process X is before time t. We
restrict agents’ strategy spaces in two ways. First, we require finite expected
stopping times, i.e., E(τ i) < ∞. Second, a player has to stop in case of
bankruptcy. More formally, we require τ i ≤ inf{t ∈ R+ : X it = 0} a.s..
To incorporate mixed strategies, we allow for randomized stopping times—
progressively measurable functions τ i(·) such that for every ri ∈ [0, 1], τ i(ri)
is a stopping time. Intuitively, agents can draw a random number ri from the
uniform distribution on [0, 1] before the game and play a stopping strategy
τ i(ri).
2.2. Payoffs
The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize, which
we normalize to one without loss of generality. Ties are broken randomly.
2The equilibrium of the model would be the same if the stopping decision was reversible
and stopped processes were constant.
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Formally,
pii =
1
k
1{Xi
τi
=maxj∈N X
j
τj
} ,
where k = |{i ∈ N : X iτ i = maxj∈N Xjτ j}|. Hence, the game is a constant
sum game. All agents maximize their expected payoff, i.e., the probability of
winning the contest. This optimization is independent of their risk attitude.
2.3. Condition on the Parameters
To ensure equilibrium existence in finite time stopping strategies, we
henceforth impose a technical condition that places a positive upper bound
on µ—for a discussion, see Section 3.2.
Assumption 1. µ < log(1 + 1
n−1)
σ2
2x0
.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we first derive the unique candidate equilibrium distribu-
tion. Second, we prove equilibrium existence—this is not trivial as the game
has discontinuous payoffs and infinite strategy spaces. Our proof shows that
there exists a stopping time inducing the candidate equilibrium distribution.
We close the section with an extension to asymmetric starting values.
3.1. The Equilibrium Distribution
Every strategy of agent i induces a (potentially non-smooth) cumulative
distribution function (cdf) F i : R+ → [0, 1] of his stopped process, where
F i(x) = P(X iτ i ≤ x).
The probability of a tie is non-zero only if the distributions of at least
two agents have a mass point above zero or the distributions of all agents
have a mass point at zero or both.3 The next lemma proves otherwise.
Lemma 1 (No Mass Points). In equilibrium, for every x > 0, no agent i ∈ N
has a mass point at x, i.e., P(X iτ i = x) = 0. At least one agent has no mass
point at zero.
3As is common in economic literature, we do not consider the mathematical problem of
an accumulation of mass points (Cantor Construction); we thus assume that either there
is only a finite number of mass points or they have no accumulation point.
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We omit the proof and present a verbal argument instead, because the
proof is simply a specialization of the now standard logic in static game theory
with a continuous state space; e.g., Burdett and Judd (1983). As usual,
mixed strategies in a competitive game can have no interior mass point at
the same point in the state space (here, the same x), since this would create
a profitable deviation in one direction: With a slightly higher x, one raises
one’s win chance a boundedly positive probability with an arbitrarily small
loss, since one beats everyone with lower x and the one player with mass at
x; however, one agent can have a mass point at zero, since any other player
who can pass him would have already been bankrupt.
Lemma 1 renders the tie-breaking rule obsolete, because it implies that
the probability of a tie is zero. Denote the winning probability of player i
if he stops at X iτi = x by u
i(x), where ui(x) : R+ → [0, 1]. As there are
no mass points away from zero, we can express ui(x) in terms of the other
agents’ cdf’s.
ui(x) = P(x > max
j 6=i
Xj
τ j
) +
1
k
P(x = max
j 6=i
Xj
τ j
})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
∏
j 6=i
P(Xj
τ j
≤ x) =
∏
j 6=i
F j(x) (1)
We call ui(·) the utility function of agent i given the distributions of other
agents. These utility functions are helpful to derive the equilibrium—a point
where each player maximizes E(ui(X iτ i)) .
Denote the right endpoint of the support of the distribution of player i
by xi = sup{x : F i(x) < 1} and the left endpoint by xi = inf{x : F i(x) > 0}.
The right endpoint has to be finite, because agents can only use strategies
that stop almost surely in finite time. The following results establish nec-
essary conditions on ui and the distribution functions in equilibrium; the
proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 2 (Strict Monotonicity). The utility ui of every agent i ∈ N is
strictly increasing on the interval [xi, xi].
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Lemma 3 (Indifference). For each player i, the utility ui(X it) is a local mar-
tingale on the interior of the support of his distribution, i.e., X it ∈ (xi, xi)⇒
E(dui(X it)|F it ) = 0.
Lemma 4 (Symmetry of the Equilibrium Distributions). The support of the
cdf of each player is identical and starts at zero.
All players share the same utility function. Hence, Lemma 3 and 4 directly
imply the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The unique equilibrium distributions are atomless and sym-
metric.
Hence, we henceforth suppress subscripts i. As the utility u does not
depend on time (∂u
∂t
= 0), by Itoˆ’s lemma the expected change in utility per
marginal unit of time is
E(du(Xt)|Ft) = E
(
(µu′(Xt) +
σ2
2
u′′(Xt))dt+ u′(Xt)σdBt|Ft
)
= µu′(Xt) +
σ2
2
u′′(Xt)dt .
By Lemma 3, this expression vanishes for all x on the support of F , which
yields the following ordinary differential equation:
0 = µu′(x) +
σ2
2
u′′(x) .
For µ 6= 0, all solutions to this equation are of the form u(x) = α+β exp(−2µx
σ2
)
for all constants α, β ∈ R. To fix α and β, we use two constraints on u. First,
all players win with probability 1
n
in equilibrium (Corollary 1). In particular,
they do so when they stop immediately (Lemma 3). Second, the value of the
cdf at zero is zero, because the support is atomless (Corollary 1). Thus, we
get:
1
n
= u(x0) = α + β exp(
−2µx0
σ2
)
0 = u(0) = α + β .
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This system of equations uniquely determines α and β, and thereby also u
as
u(x) = min
{
1,
1
n
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1
}
.
It remains to construct the corresponding equilibrium distributions. For this
purpose, we insert the symmetry property of the equilibrium (Corollary 1)
into equation (1) to get
ui(x) =
n∏
j 6=i
F j(x) = F (x)n−1 ⇒ F (x) = n−1
√
ui(x) .
Hence, we characterize the unique candidate for an equilibrium distribution
as follows (for an illustration, see Figure 1):
Proposition 1. Assume µ 6= 0. A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, if
and only if each player’s strategy induces the cumulative distribution function
F (x) = min
{
1, n−1
√
1
n
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1
}
.
Proof. We have already proven that any equilibrium strategy is symmetric
and induces the distribution F . To complete the proof, we need to show
that no deviation gives a player a winning probability greater than 1
n
. Recall
that, by construction of F , ui(X it) is a supermartingale. By Doob’s optional
stopping theorem (Revuz and Yor, 2005, p.70), the stopped process ui(X iτ i)
is also a supermartingale. Hence, E(ui(X iτ i)) ≤ E(ui(xi0)) = 1n .
To complete the analysis, we scrutinize the special case in which X it is
a martingale, i.e., µ = 0. In this case, the first term in the differential
equation vanishes. The same calculation as in the case µ 6= 0 yields the
unique equilibrium distribution, where
F (x) = min
{
1, n−1
√
x
nx0
}
.
F (x) is continuous in µ at µ = 0, because the same formula follows by taking
10
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Figure 1: An example (µ = −0.1, x0 = 100, σ = 1) of the equilibrium cdf’s
for different sizes of players n.
limits in Proposition 1, using the approximation eA = 1 + A + O(A2) for
small A.
3.2. Equilibrium Strategies
So far, we have been silent about the existence of a finite time stopping
strategy τ inducing the equilibrium distribution F . For a given distribution
to be implementable in finite time stopping strategies, its right endpoint has
to be finite. Recall that
1 = F (x) = n−1
√
1
n
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1 .
Hence, the right endpoint x satisfies
x =
σ2
−2µ log(n(exp(
−2µx0
σ2
)− 1) + 1) .
Consequently, the right endpoint is finite if and only if µ < − log(1− 1
n
) σ
2
2x0
,
11
i.e., Assumption 1 holds; otherwise, no equilibrium in finite time stopping
strategies exists. Intuitively, if the drift becomes too large, for every point x,
the strategy, which stops only at 0 and x, reaches x with a probability higher
than 1
n
.
In the next step, we derive mixed strategies inducing the distribution F
in the two-player case to convey the main intuition. The construction uses a
mixture of deterministic threshold strategies to induce the final distribution.
To formalize this intuition, we introduce the martingale transformation φ :
R+ → R+, where
φ(x) =
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1 .
By Itoˆ’s lemma (since φ′′/φ′ = −2µ/σ2), the process (φ(X it))t∈R+ is a mar-
tingale. In this case, F (x) = φ(x)/2.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Strategy for Two Players). If agent i randomly
selects a number α ∈ (0, 1] from a uniform distribution and stops if
τ i = inf{t : |φ(X it)− 1| ≥ α} ,
then the cumulative distribution function induced by this strategy equals F ,
i.e., P(X iτ i ≤ x) = F (x).
Proof. By the martingale property of (φ(X it))t∈R+ , we get
P(φ(X iτ i) = 1− α) = P(φ(X iτ i) = 1 + α) =
1
2
.
As α is uniformly distributed on (0, 1] and agent i stops iff φ(X it) = 1 ± α,
the random variable φ(X iτ i) is uniformly distributed on [0, 2]. It follows that
P(X iτ i ≤ x) = P(φ(X iτ i) ≤ φ(x)) =
φ(x)
2
= F (x) .
For more than two players, the feasibility proof requires an auxiliary
result from probability theory on the Skorokhod embedding problem. This
12
literature studies whether a distribution is feasible by stopping a stochastic
process; in their terminology, there exists an embedding of a probability
distribution in the process. Skorokhod (1961, 1965) analyzes the problem
of embedding in Brownian motion without drift. In a recent contribution,
Pedersen and Peskir (2001) derive a necessary and sufficient condition for
general non-singular diffusions. They define the scale function S(·) by
S(x) =
∫ x
0
exp(−2
∫ u
0
µ(r)
σ(r)
dr)du = −σ
2
2µ
(exp(
−2µx
σ2
)− 1) .
Lemma 5 (Pedersen and Peskir, 2001, Theorem 2.1.). Let (Xt) be a non-
singular diffusion on R starting at zero, let S(·) denote its scale function
satisfying S(0) = 0, and let ν be a probability measure on R satisfying
|S(x)|ν(dx) < ∞ . Set m = ∫R S(x)ν(dx). Then there exists a stopping
time τ∗ for (Xt) such that Xτ∗ ∼ ν if and only if one of the following four
cases holds:
1. S(−∞) = −∞ and S(∞) =∞ ;
2. S(−∞) = −∞, S(∞) <∞ and m ≥ 0 ;
3. S(−∞) > −∞, S(∞) =∞ and m ≤ 0 ;
4. S(−∞) > −∞, S(∞) <∞ and m = 0 .
Hence, to prove feasibility for our distribution F , it suffices to showm = 0.
Proposition 3 (Feasibility of the Equilibrium Distribution). There exists a
stopping strategy inducing the distribution F (·) from Proposition 1.
Proof. To verify the condition in Pedersen and Peskir (2001), we need a
process which starts in zero. Thus, we consider the process X˜t = Xt − X0.
After some transformations, we get S(x−x0) = −σ22µ(1−exp(2µx0σ2 ))(φ(x)−1).
This gives us
m =
∫
R
S(x− x0)f(x)dx
= −σ
2
2µ
(
1− exp(2µx0
σ2
)
)(∫
R
φ(x)f(x)dx− 1
)
.
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Consequently, it remains to show
∫
R f(x)φ(x)dx = 1.
∫
R
f(x)φ(x)dx =
∫ x
0
(n−
1
n−1 )
n− 1 φ(x)
−n−2
n−1φ′(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(x)
φ(x)dx
=
∫ φ(x)
φ(0)
(n−
1
n−1 )
n− 1 y
1
n−1 dy
=
[
(n−
1
n−1 )
n
y
n
n−1
]y=φ(x)=n
y=φ(0)=0
= 1 .
As m = 0, there exists an embedding for the distribution F by Theorem 2.1.
in Pedersen and Peskir (2001).4
Proposition 1 and 3 combined yield F as the unique equilibrium distri-
bution of the game.
3.3. An Extension: Asymmetric Starting Values
In this extension, we allow for heterogeneity in the starting values. To get
an analytical solution, we restrict attention to the two-player case—without
loss of generality x10 > x
2
0. The proof of the following proposition is similar
to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the cdf of the first player is
F 1(x) = min
{
1,
1
2
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(
−2µx10
σ2
)− 1
}
.
The cdf of the second player is
F 2(x) = min
{
1, ρ+ (1− ρ)1
2
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
exp(
−2µx10
σ2
)− 1
}
.
4An alternative proof of Proposition 3 would verify a result on embedding in Brownian
with drift from Grandits and Falkner (2000) for the process X˜t =
Xt−X0
σ .
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Proof. The cdf of player 1 is the same as in the symmetric case. Thus, it is
feasible by Proposition 2. For player 2, consider the following strategy: First,
play until X2t ∈ {0, x10}; then use the same stopping strategy as player 1 if he
reaches x10. This induces the above cdf, where the constant ρ—probability of
absorption in 0—fulfills
ρ =
exp(
−2µ(x10−x20)
σ2
)− 1
exp(
−2µ(x10−x20)
σ2
)− exp(2µx20
σ2
)
.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, the expected winning probability for each
player in the above equilibrium candidate is the same as if he stops immedi-
ately. Furthermore, as ui(X it) is a supermartingale by construction, Doob’s
optional stopping theorem implies that the stopped processes ui(X iτi) are
supermartingales for any τi. Hence, no player can do better than to stop
immediately, which yields the equilibrium payoff. We show uniqueness of the
equilibrium in the appendix.
Compared to the symmetric case, the player with the lower starting value
takes more risks here. In particular, he loses everything with probability ρ
and takes the same gamble as player 1 with probability 1−ρ. Asymmetry in
the contest leads to higher percentage losses for a negative drift, because the
handicapped player takes higher risks to compensate his initial disadvantage.
4. Comparative Statics
This section analyzes how changes in the parameters affect the expected
value of the stopped processes. To determine the expected value, we first
calculate the density from the cdf in Proposition 1:
f(x) =
2µ
n(n− 1)σ2
2−n
n−1
√
exp(−2µx
σ2
)− 1
n(exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1)
exp(−2µx
σ2
)
1− exp(−2µx0
σ2
)
.
In what follows, we restrict attention to the two-player case for tractability;
in the appendix, we state the formula for the expected value for n players.
We use the density f to derive the expected value of the stopped processes
15
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Figure 2: An example (n = 2, x0 = 100) of the expected value of the stopped
processes E(Xτ ) depending on the drift µ for different values of variance σ.
for two players:
E(Xτ ) = Ef (x) =
∫ x
0
xf(x)dx
=
σ2
2µ
+ (1 +
1
2(exp(−2µx0
σ2
)− 1))(x0 −
σ2 log(2− exp(2µx0
σ2
))
2µ
) .
The explicit formula of the expected value allows us to characterize its shape
in the following proposition—the proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 5. E(Xτ ) is quasi-convex, falling, then rising in µ. If µ < 0,
E(Xτ ) is quasi-convex, falling, then rising in σ.
Hence, an increase in the drift does not imply an increase in the expected
value of the stopped processes. Intuitively, for µ < 0, there are two oppos-
ing effects: an increase in the drift lowers the expected losses per time but
increases the expected stopping time. Similarly, as the variance increases,
16
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Figure 3: An example (n = 2, x0 = 100) of the expected value of the stopped
processes E(Xτ ) depending on the variance σ for different values of drift µ.
the gamble gets more attractive, but it also takes less time to implement the
equilibrium distribution.
From an economic point of view, Proposition 5 illustrates a drawback of
relative performance payments in risky environments: even if risky invest-
ment opportunities have only a slightly negative expected value, the principal
loses a lot in expectation. Intuitively, contestants only care about outper-
foming each other and thus behave as if they were risk-loving. A simple
linear compensation scheme based on absolute performance would avoid this
drawback.
4.1. A Comparison to Related Models
In the static two-player contest of Lazear and Rosen (1981), contest suc-
cess depends on the effort choice and the realization of a random variable. In
their framework, contests are suitable to induce the optimal amount of effort.
If, in our two-player model, agents had to specify a fixed date at which they
stop, they would stop immediately for negative values of the drift. Hence, to
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obtain our results, we need a dynamic decision problem for each player.
The equilibrium distributions in the present paper are similar to those of
all-pay auctions with complete information (e.g., Hillman and Samet, 1987,
or Baye et al., 1996).5 In both settings, the joint equilibrium distribution
of the other players makes each player indifferent. The trade-off between a
higher risk and a higher chance to win the prize thus serves as an implicit
cost. In contrast to the all-pay auction, all players participate actively in the
contest in any equilibrium.
5. Conclusion
We have studied a new continuous’ time model of contests. Contrary
to the previous literature, players face a trade-off between a higher winning
probability and a higher risk. If there are no good investment opportunities
available, e.g., in a declining industry, contestants behave as if they were risk-
loving—they invest in projects with negative expected returns. According to
our main characterization result, Proposition 5, this problem is most severe
for the natural case in which the drift is close to zero.
From a technical point of view, this paper has developed a new method to
verify equilibrium existence. The approach via Skorokhod embeddings seems
promising to analyze other models without observability, because there are
many sufficient conditions available in the probability theory literature.
6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume, by contradiction, there exists an interval I =
(a, b) ⊂ [xi, xi] such that ui(x) = ∏j 6=i F j(x) is constant for all x ∈ I. We
distinguish three cases:
(i) For all players j 6= i, F j(a) = 1 . Hence, by optimality, player i stops
with probability 1 whenever at maxj 6=i xj. This implies maxj 6=i xj ≤ a ≤ xi
and player i wins for sure. Player j can deviate profitably and stop only if
she hits 0 or xi, which contradicts the equilibrium assumption.
5Complete information about valuations in the all-pay auction corresponds to complete
information about starting values in this paper.
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(ii) There exists a player j 6= i with F j(b) = 0. Hence, in equilibrium,
no player ever stops in the interval (0, xj), but at least two players stop with
positive probability in every -ball around xj. To stop at xj (with ui(xj) = 0
by Lemma 1) is strictly worse than to continue until X it ∈ {0,maxj xj}. By
continuity (Lemma 1), the argument extends to an -neighborhood of xj.
This contradicts the equilibrium assumption of weak optimality of stopping
in (xj, xj + ).
(iii) No player j 6= i stops in I, but (i) and (ii) do not hold. Hence,
player i does not stop in I. Denote by x˜ the infimum of points above b at
which a player stops. At x˜ (and, by continuity at an -neighborhood of x˜), it
is strictly better to continue until Xjt ∈ { b+a2 ,maxj xj} than to stop, which
contradicts the equilibrium assumption.
Proof of Lemma 3: We define Φ(x) =
∏n
i=1 F
i(x) = F i(x)ui(x). Denote the
set of players who stop at x by M(x) ⊆ N , i.e.,
M(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (F i)′(x) 6= 0} .
By Lemma 2, |M(x)| ≥ 2 for all mini∈N xi < x < maxi∈N xi. For notational
convenience, we omit the point x, at which all functions are evaluated, i.e.,
we write F i,M instead of F i(x),M(x). Furthermore, we write E(dui(x))
shorthand for E(dui(X is)|F is) given X is = x. For every agent k /∈M , we have:
|M |Φ′ =
∑
i∈M
(F iui)′ =
∑
i∈M
(
F iui
′
+ F i
′
ui
)
=
∑
i∈M
F iui
′
+
∑
i∈N
F i
′
ui︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ′
⇔ (|M | − 1)Φ′ =
∑
i∈M
F iui
′
⇒ (|M | − 1)F kuk ′ =
∑
i∈M
F iui
′
⇒ (|M | − 1)F kuk ′′ =
∑
i∈M
(
F iui
′′
+ F i
′
ui
′)
.
We calculate the expected change in winning probability of player k if he
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continues to play for an infinitesimally short time E(duk):
(|M | − 1)F kE(duk) = (|M | − 1)F k(µuk ′ + σ
2
2
uk
′′
)
= µ(|M | − 1)F kuk ′ + σ
2
2
(|M | − 1)F kuk ′′
= µ
∑
i∈M
F iui
′
+
σ2
2
∑
i∈M
(
F iui
′′
+ F i
′
ui
′)
=
∑
i∈M
(µui
′
+
σ2
2
ui
′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E(dui)=0
)F i +
∑
i∈M
F i
′
ui
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 .
As agent i ∈M stops with strictly positive probability in any neighborhood
of x, he is indifferent between the strategy that stops at x and any other
strategy that stops in a small neighborhood of x. Thus, E(dui(x)) = 0.
So far, we have shown that E(dui(x)) = 0 if i ∈ M(x) and E(dui(x)) > 0 if
i /∈ M(x). For every agent i, there exists an interval I ⊂ [xi, xi] such that
i ∈ M(x) for every x ∈ I. Whenever X it = x ∈ I, agent i is indifferent
between the strategy that stops immediately and the strategy τ = inf{t : t ∈
{xi, xi}}. Formally,
0 = ui(x)− E(ui(Xτ ))
= ui(x)− E(ui(x) +
∫ τ
t
µui
′
(X is) +
σ2
2
ui
′′
(X is)ds+
∫ τ
t
ui
′
(X is)σdBs)
= E(
∫ τ
t
µui
′
(X is) +
σ2
2
ui
′′
(X is)ds) = u
i(x) + E(
∫ τ
t
E(dui(X is))) .
The process enters every interval and E(dui(x)) is non-negative for all x ∈
[xi, xi]. Hence, the expectation E(
∫ τ
t
E(dui(X is))) can only be zero if E(dui(x)) =
0 almost surely.
Proof of Lemma 4: By contradiction, assume maxi x
i 6= 0. Thus, to stop at
X it = x
i (and, by continuity in a neighborhood of this point) is strictly worse
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than to continue until Xjt ∈ {0,maxi xi}; this contradicts optimality.
Assume there exists players i and j such that xi > xj. Assume player j
reaches his right endpoint at time t, Xjt = x
j. By the same argument as in
Lemma 3, the continuation strategy τ = inf{s ≥ t : Xjs ∈ {xj − , xi}} is
strictly better than to stop at xj, which contradicts optimality.
Proof of Proposition 4: To prove uniqueness, note that Lemma 1-4 do not
rely on any symmetry arguments and do still hold. Hence, the equation
ui(x) = F j(x) fixes the above construction uniquely given the right end-
point. The minmax property (constant sum game) implies that each player
must receive the same payoff in any equilibrium. Thus, the local martingale
condition uniquely determines x. By Lemma 1, only one agent might set a
mass point at 0. Feasibility implies that the agent with the lower starting
value sets the mass point at zero and uniquely determines the size of the
mass point.
Formula for the Expected Value in the n-Player Case:
Let Hyp denote the Gauss hypergeometric function.
E(x) =
∫ x
0
xf(x)dx = (xF (x)− 0F (0))−
∫ x
0
F (x)dx
= x−
∫ x
0
n−1
√
1
n
exp(−2µx)− 1
exp(−2µx)− 1dx
= x+
n−1
√
1− exp(−2µx)
2µ
(n− 1)Hyp( 1
n− 1 ,
1
n− 1 ,
n− 2
n− 1 , exp(2µx)) .
Proof of Proposition 5. We apply the monotone transformation y = exp(2µx0
σ2
)
to E(Xτ ) to get
E(Xτ ) =
x0
log(y)
+ (1 +
y
2(1− y))(x0 −
x0 log(2− y)
log(y)
) ,
= x0
(
1
log(y)
+ (1 +
y
2(1− y))(1−
log(2− y)
log(y)
)
)
.
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for y 6= 1. This expression is convex if and only if it is convex for x0 = 1.
Assumption 1 implies y ∈ (0, 2).
∂2E(Xτ )/x0
∂y2
=
4(−2 + y)(−1 + y)3 + 2(−1 + y)2 (2− 5y + 2y2) log(y)
2(−2 + y)(−1 + y)3y2 log(y)3
+
y2 (3− 4y + y2) log(y)2 − 2(−2 + y)y2 log(y)3
2(−2 + y)(−1 + y)3y2 log(y)3
− (−2 + y) log(2− y)(2(−2 + y)(−1 + y)
2 − 2y2 log(y)2)
2(−2 + y)(−1 + y)3y2 log(y)3
− (−2 + y) log(2− y) log(y) (−2 + 7y − 6y
2 + y3)
2(−2 + y)(−1 + y)3y2 log(y)3
with the continuous extension ∂
2E(Xτ )/x0
∂y2
= 1
6
at y = 1. Simple algebra shows
that nominator and denominator are negative on y ∈ (0, 2), y 6= 1. Hence,
the function is convex on (0, 2). As y is monotone increasing in µ, E(X iτ i)
is quasi-convex in µ. As y is also monotone increasing (decreasing) in σ for
µ < 0 (µ > 0), E(X iτ i) is quasi-convex (quasi-concave) in σ if µ < 0 (µ > 0).
It remains to show that E(Xτ ) is first decreasing, then increasing. For
µ→ −∞ and µ→ 0, E(Xτ )→ x0. For any negative value of µ, the expected
value of the stopped processes is smaller than x0, because the process is a
supermartingale. Hence, by quasi-convexity, E(Xτ ) has to be first decreasing,
then increasing.
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